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DOUBTING DONALD: A REPLY TO 
PROFESSOR DONALD GALLOWAY'S 
"CRITICAL MIST AKES"** 
by 
Richard F. Devlin* 
In a recent article Professor Galloway has argued that supporters 
of the Critical Legal Studies perspective make five fundamental 
errors in their analyses of liberal theory and as a result have 
failed in their deconstructive agenda. In this essay Professor Devlin 
replies to these criticisms and posits that Galloway's essay in 
retrieval is itself subject to the very same errors of which he 
accuses the "crits". Moreover, it is argued that the nature of 
Gal/,oway 's partial defence of liberalism confirms rather than 
denies the accuracy of critical assessments. 
Donald l'incredule: Reponse aux "Critical Mistakes" 
(Erreurs critiques) du professeur Donald Galloway 
Un article recent du professeur GaUoway pretend que Les partisans 
des Critical Legal Studies (Etudes juridi,ques criti,ques) commettent 
cinq erreurs fondamentales dans leurs analyses de la theorie 
liberate, et que par consequent ils echouent dans leur tentative 
de deconstruction. le� le professeur Devlin repond a ces criti,ques 
en affirmant que l 'essai d 'iteration de Galloway commet Les memes 
erreurs dont ii accuse Les "criticistes. " En plus, le present auteur 
trouve que la defense partielle du liberalisme offerte par Galloway, 
win de nier !'exactitude des evaluations criticistes, tend plutot 
a Les confirmer. 
"An observation of human behaviour is that people respond, often 
dramatically, when the ideas that give meaning to their lives are 
threatened. Critical Legal Studies challenges many of the things that 
constitute the psychological and professional identity of legal academics, 
so their response is understandable. While CLS has been scorned and 
derided, at least within the legal academy it has had a profoundly 
disquieting impact in undermining the accepted modes of legal dis­
course. One response has been simply to attempt to remove the critics. 
For more thoughtful and committed scholars, a di.fferenr response has 
been to build an intellectual defense."' 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Calgary. 
** Versions of this paper were presented at the Western Canadian Legal Theory 
Symposium, University of Alberta, March 1991; The Theorea Workshop 
at the University of Windsor, April, 1991; and Carleton Legal Theory 
Workshop, May 1991. I would particularly like to thank Sandy Dobrowolsky, 
Allan Hutchinson and Alan Hunt for their comments on a draft. The essay 
is dedicated to the memory of Mary Joe Frug. 
1 J.M. Feinman, "Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies" (1988), 
87 Mich. LR 724, 730. 
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It seems to me that one of the most interesting developments 
in the legal scholarship of the rich Euro-American societies has 
been the emergence of what has become known as Critical Legal 
Studies. Somewhat less interesting, but politically crucial, has been 
the response triggered in the legal academy. At first, the liberal 
legal academy was open to critical analyses while they were sti11 
in embryonic form and scarce enough to be politically unthreatening. 
However, as the movement has garnered strength (and followers) 
the limits of liberal tolerance have rapidly been reached. It is in 
the United States that the reaction has been most vehement with 
widely publicized invectives from pillars of the American legal 
academy calling for the expulsion of the Crits from the citadel.2 
In Britain, the response has been more subtle suggesting that there 
is nothing particularly innovative about the Crits, that they may 
be merely "iconoclastic social democrats",3 "perhaps no more than 
a passing fashion'1.4 
Characteristically, the Canadian response has been more muted.5 
In this brief essay I want to respond to what I consider to be an 
important Canadian challenge to critical legal studies, Professor 
Donald Galloway's "Critical Mistakes".6 In so doing I will suggest 
2 P. Carrington, "Of Law and the River" (1984), 34 J. of Leg. Ed. 222; R. 
Posner, "The Present Situation in Legal Scholarship" (I 9 81), 90 Yale LJ. 
11 I 3, 1128. For a useful overview of reactions to the crits in the United 
States coupled with some thoughtful replies see J. Frug, "McCarthyism and 
Critical Legal Studies" (1987), 22 Harv. C.RC.LLR 665. 
3 N. MacCormick, "Reconstruction After Deconstruction: A Response to CLS" 
(1990), 10 Ox. J. Leg. St. 539. 
4 J.M. Finnis, "On Legal Studies Movement" in J. Eekelaar, J. Bell (eds.) Oxford 
Essays in Jurisprudence (Third Series) ( 1987) 145. The politeness of the British 
response should not however be understood as totally benign for MacCormick 
accuses various crits of being "contemptuous" and "impertinent" (supra note 
3, 555 & 556), and Finnis posits that Unger is "careless" ( id., 150) and 
guilty of "alarmist conjuring" (id, 163). Perhaps the most vitriolic response 
is Tony Weir's review of Hugh Collins, The Law of Contract (1986), in 
which he variously accuses Collins of inter alia, "perversity", "obscurity", 
"omission", "misrepresentation" and "inaccuracy" (1986), 45 C.LJ. 501. As 
will become obvious, similar accusations underpin Galloway's essay. 
5 For some responses to the Crits in Canada see L. Green "The Political Content 
of Legal Theory" ( 1987), 17 Phil Soc. Sci. I; D. Dyzenhaus, "The New 
Positivists" (1989), 39 U. T.LJ. 361; B. Langille, "Revolution without Foun­
dation: The Grammar of Scepticism and Law" (1988), 34 McGill LJ. 451; 
J. Underwood Lewis, "Jurisprudence" (1988), 20 Ottawa LR 671, 681; J.E. 
Bickenbach, Review: The Rule of Law: Ideal or Ideology (1989), 39 U. T.LJ. 
211, 213. 
6 In R.F. Devlin, Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory (1991) 255, hereinafter 
Perspectives. All page references to Galloway's essay in text will be given 
in parentheses. A note of explanation is perhaps appropriate here. I asked 
Professor Galloway to participate in this book, which is an attempt to develop 
a set of Canadian teaching materials, as I believe he is an important interlocutor 
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that, first, he is guilty of some of the very things of which he accuses 
the crits; second, that his cautious defence of liberalism betrays 
a startlingly anaemic vision of the liberal theoretical agenda; and 
third, that his strategies of resistance incorporate both of the re­
actions outlined by Feinman in the opening quotation. To be fair 
to Galloway, though, he is no "fundamentalist liberal"7 for he 
recognizes some of the limitations of liberalism and acknowledges 
that the crits may have done some good. However, as I read 
him, these laurels are begrudgingly given and relate more to the 
vivacious style and emotionalism of the crits, and not to their 
substance. 
But I rush ahead of myself. Before I substantiate these propositions 
through a cautious reading of Galloway's arguments, it will be 
helpful if I trace (if only briefly) the outline of his thesis. Galloway 
commences his article with a confession that the "non radical 
mainstreaqi literature" [255] on law is somewhat flawed, but argues 
that it is much less problematic than the crits suggest. Indeed, he 
states that his aim is to "reassert ... the strengths of mainstream 
theory" [256], to "expose ... the weaknesses in the Crit strategies" 
[256], and that his method will be to demonstrate that crits have 
failed to "meet stringent internal requirements" [256]. In short, his 
is a self confessed essay in redemption. 
The essence of his concern and the nature of his redemptive 
technique are captured in the following quotation: 
"Canadian Crits have used a number of strategies . . .  to dissuade 
people from exploring in depth or taking seriously the writings of 
non-radical theorists. I proceed by examining five of these strategies 
with a view to arguing that, while they may have been successful 
in so persuading people, they ought not to have been" [256, footnote 
omitted]. 
in the Canadian jurisprudential debate. As with all contributors, I gave him 
fairly wide scope to address whatever he felt was his current interest and 
perspective. I did request him to contribute to the Chapter on Liberalism, 
but he indicated that his preference would be to do a critique of the crits 
and I thought, and still think, it was a great idea as it reinforces the dialogic 
aspirations of the book. The only two limitations I set were that it be 
approximately twenty-five pages, and be as "Canadian" as possible. Ob­
viously, in a text of the nature of Canadian Perspectives on Legal Theory 
it would have been an abuse of my editorial role to comment on Galloway's 
essay. Therefore, what follows is an attempt to continue the critical con­
versation in the spirit of openness and genuine disagreement. I should also 
point out that this is Galloway's second challenge to the crits, the first being 
his review of Allan Hutchinson's Dwelling on the Threshold (1988), perhaps 
somewhat harshly entitled, "No Guru, No Method" (1988), 8 Windsor Yearb. 
Access Justice 304. 
7 I borrow this phrase from Asbjorn Eide, "Strategies to Enforce the Right 
to Food", Presentation at "Human Rights in the Twenty-First Century: A 
Global Challenge", Ban ff, Alberta, November 9-12, 1990. 
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The remainder of the essay is a purported identification, doc­
umentation and deflation of these five posited critical strategies 
interspersed with some modest revisions of mainstream theory. 
More specifically, Galloway claims that the crits are guilty of: 
a) the false representation of non-critical positions; b) an absence 
of consideration of the nature of the enterprise upon which 
mainstream theorists are embarked; c) a reductionist reading of 
the rich and diverse liberal tradition; d) a failure to pay sufficient 
attention to, and discriminate between, the various positions within 
liberal theory; and e) the presentation of mainstream theory as 
an instrument of legitimation. In support of these indictments, 
Galloway draws heavily on the work of Joseph Raz and Ronald 
Dworkin. 
If Professor Galloway was correct in these accusations, if he 
was accurate in his claim that the crits unfairly mislead people 
as to the virtues of liberal legal theory, then I do believe that 
this essay woulq be a serious challenge to the integrity of the 
critical agenda. However, I think that his critique is, in part, 
inaccurate and misplaced, and that his revision of the liberal project 
ultimately causes more, rather than less, problems for the liberal 
theoretical agenda. My purpose in this essay is to analyze and 
rebut each of Galloway's criticisms in turn and, in the process, 
to provide some further elaboration of certain critical positions 
as well as to conjecture as to the current status of the critical 
legal studies movement. 
a) False Representation 
Galloway's primary complaint is that Crits represent "noncritical 
positions falsely" [257]. This he variously describes as "patent 
inaccuracy" [257], a most "pernicious gambit" [257] and a 
"misinformation" [258] campaign. Just in case there is any doubt 
as to the seriousness of Galloway's concern, he emphasizes "that 
he is not referring to unusual interpretations of a text or argument" 
[257]. 
Galloway's first, and therefore I assume star, example of 
allegedly false representation relates to two sentences which he 
selects from one of my recently published articles. He quotes: 
Coercion has been much ignored in recent jurisprudential debate. 
Not surprisingly liberals, emphasizing rights, have tended to ignore 
this issue because it raises the spectre of a legitimation crisis.8 
Several points are worth noting about these sentences. The first 
is that Galloway provides little by way of their context. The sentences 
are to be found in an article that has less to do with critiquing 
"liberal theory" than providing a neo-marxist interpretation and 
examples of the nature and practice of law, premised upon an 
existentialist/situationalist rather than mainstream methodology. 
8 "Law's Centaurs: An Inquiry into the Nature and Relations of Law, State 
and Violence" (1989), 27 Osgoode Hall LJ. 219, 235. 
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Secondly, the sentences that follow those quoted by Galloway then 
proceed to criticize the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, the 
North American Critical Legal Studies Movement and neo-Marxist 
theorists of the state for also underestimating the potency of state 
violence. Consequently, the first sentence of the quotation refers 
to both mainstream and critical theory. Can one sentence in a seventy 
four page essay that does not specifically address liberal legal theory 
really do as much as Galloway fears? 
Moreover, and third, if we are to be in the business of textual 
nitpicking, I do not say that liberals have "ignored" the issue of 
coercion, rather it is that they have "tended to ignore" it. My point 
was to suggest that it plays a less than crucial role in much of 
modern liberal analysis. But Galloway would reject even this restated 
version of my position. For example, he points to Dworkin's Law's 
Empire arguing that it is "built around the premise that the point 
of law is to guide and constrain the power of government" [258] 
and then proceeds to quote one sentence from Dworkin which states 
that, in essence, the use of force by the state is legitimate if it 
fits with previous political decisions as to when it can be legitimately 
used. This, then, is meant to be a refutation of my proposition as 
to the decentralization of coercion from the liberal discursive agenda. 
Galloway sells Dworkin short here for, indeed, in Law's Empire 
there is a specific section entitled, "Grounds and Force of Law" 
that runs for a whole five pages! A careful reading of �his section 
and a sensitivity to its location in Dworkin's 470 page tome confirms 
rather than denies my passing comment. For Dworkin, the neces­
sarily coercive nature of law is a taken for granted assumption 
that does not merit jurisprudential interrogation. Dworkin posits: 
for us, legal argument takes place on a rough plateau of consensus 
that if law exists it provides a justification for the collective use 
of power against individual citizens or groups.9 
Or as he says a little later, legal philosophers "share a general 
unspecified opinion about the force of law .. . the law should be 
obeyed and enforced." 10 Viewed in the light of these assumptions, 
we should be grateful to Dworkin for even spending five pages 
buried one quarter of the way through his book to address this 
non-issue upon which there is jurisprudential consensus. 
There are at least two problems with Dworkin's propositions. 
First, instrumentalist marxists11 and radically empathetic liberals, 12 
for example, have worried at length about the coercive dimensions 
of law, and so Dworkin's consensual claim is quite simply inaccurate 
9 Law's Empire (1986), 108 [hereinafter Empire]. 
10 ld,1l1. 
1 1 See, for example, certain aspects of Marx's and Engels' analysis of the use 
of penal laws against Catholics in Ireland in Ireland and the Irish Question 
(1971 ), and Lenin's, The State and Revolution (l 976) . 
12 See, for example, Robert Cover, "Violence and the Word" (1986), 95 Yale 
LJ. 1601. 
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unless, of course, he conceives of the legal philosophical community 
as populated exclusively by relatively like minded (Oxford based) 
jurisprudents. This, however, leads to my second concern. Just 
because a bunch of privileged academics agree that the force of 
law is not important in any jurisprudentially interesting way does 
not mean that it is not an important question existentially for those 
who are the victims of legal violence. Indeed the purpose of my 
essay, drawing as it does from a view from the bottom, 1 3  was to 
introduce a note of discordance into the otherwise harmonious 
chorus of jurisprudential choirboys. Consensus, if based upon 
exclusion, can be repressive rather than accurate. 
But even Dworkin seems uncomfortable with the position of what 
might be called "assumed foundational irrelevancy" and so, a few 
pages later, he supplements his cavalier confession with contrived 
avoidance. He claims that: 
Academic tradition enforces a certain division of labour in thinking 
about law. Poljtical philosophers consider problems about the force 
of law, and academic lawyers and specialists in jurisprudence study 
issues about its grounds. Philosophies of law are in consequence 
usually unbalanced theories of law: they are mainly about the grounds 
and almost silent about the force of law. They abstract from the 
problem of force, that is, in order to study the problem of grounds 
more carefully. 1 4  
I think two interconnected points are relevant here. Some feminists 
have suggested that many scholars tend to point to structures as 
justification for their own personal failures to deal with certain 
issues. This is variously described as "reification", or the "denial 
of agency". I 5  Viewed from this perspective, and temporarily as­
suming that Dworkin is accurate, "academic tradition" does 
not "enforce"; rather, legal philosophers have chosen not to deal 
with the question of the interconnection between law and force. 
Viewed in this light, Dworkin's "silen(ce) about the force of law" 
may be reinterpreted as an attempt to wish the problem out of 
existence. 
Secondly, Dworkin's claim that there is a division of labour 
between "political philosophers" and "academic lawyers" is mis­
leading and unsustainable. Classical jurists as diverse as Plato, 
Aquinas, Austin, Kelsen and one of Dworkin's own heroes, Kant, 
have devoted significant aspects of their work to a discussion of 
1 3  As the introduction to my essay made clear, my view from the bottom 
is that of an Irish person who grew up in British occupied Northern Ireland. 
A parallel but different jurisprudential narrative from the bottom is provided 
by Mari Matsuda, "Critical Legal Studies, C.L.S. and Reparations" ( l  987), 
22 Har. CLCRLR 323. 
1 4  Empire, 1 1 1 .  
1 5  See, for example, Jill McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile", 
in A. Miles and G. Finn (eds.), Feminism in Canada: From Pressure to Politics 
( 1 982), 27. 
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the "force" of law, as well as to its "grounds". 16 What this suggests 
is that Dworkin does not want to deal with the issue of domination 
through law. Rather, his preference is to simply take it for granted, 
to use it as a foundation upon which to construct his own legal . . 
empire. 
But my point about Dworkin, and Galloway's defence of him, 
is larger. It is not just that Dworkin's discussion of the coercive 
elements of law is cursory and superficial, an angle that enables 
him to play out his fantasies of chain novels and Hercules atop 
Olympus that go on for hundreds of pages. Rather, it is that in 
his scheme of things, law as coercion is a jurisprudential problematic 
addressed, if at all, only to be hurriedly disposed of, rather than 
being understood as a pervasive, systemic and systematic practice 
of human victimization which philosopher kings cannot even 
imagine let alone understand. It is for this reason that I asserted, 
and now reaffirm, that liberal jurists like Dworkin "have tended 
to ignore" coercion, because we are in fact talking about two 
different things. Let me develop this last point in more detail by 
dealing with Galloway's second proposed supporting text for his 
rebuttal of my comments. 1 7  
As I had not read The Morality of Freedom when I wrote "Law's 
Centaur" I was discomfited by Galloway's proposition that "it offers 
a penetrating (sic) analysis and persuasive account of (coercion's) 
proper role in a liberal state" [258]. Consequently, I have spent 
several weeks studying both the text, and the hefty symposium 
dedicated to Raz entitled, The Works of Joseph Raz. 1 8  At first blush, 
it would appear that Galloway's position is fair comment and that 
I am rightly chastised, and perhaps should even be contrite, for 
the first three substantive chapters, almost 80 pages in all, are an 
inquiry into the nature and justification of the authority to use 
coercion. However, a less superficial analysis rapidly indicates that, 
in fact, Raz is not really concerned with what I am pointing out 
in my paper. Raz's primary concern, in perfect harmony with 
mainstream jurisprudential analysis, is to provide a justification for 
the authoritative invocation of coercion through state and law. Like 
Dworkin, at this stage in Raz's argument, coercion is simply assumed 
and the jurisprudential exercise becomes one of developing argu­
ments to legitimize it. This leads to a fetishization of the concept 
of authority and a marginalization of the reality of coercion. 19  My 
16 For a brief discussion of some of their thoughts on law and force see R.F. 
Devlin, "Nomos and Thanatos Part A: The Killing Fields; Modern Law 
and Legal Theory" (1989), 12 Dal LJ. 298, 317. 
17 Raz, The Morality of Freedom (1987) [hereinafter Morality]. 
1 s (1989), 62 So. Cal LR 731-1235. 
19 This concern that violence and coercion are not really central concerns 
for Raz, that they are nagging philosophical nuisances that need to be dealt 
with, is reinforced by Raz's own proposition, after having discussed "Au­
thority", that "The stage is set for the examination of our main topic" 
[Morality, 107]. Guess what is not really all that important? 
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paper, on the other hand, seeks to identify a prior question. As 
its title and overall substance make clear, my primary concern is 
descriptive and explanatorial rather than legitimizing in nature. It 
is an attempt to highlight the lived reality and pervasiveness of 
the violence of law and state in liberal democratic society. The 
difference is fundamental in that although Raz and I may use the 
same word, coercion, we are actually talking about two different 
things. For Raz, coercion is an abstraction, a philosophical problem 
that needs to be dealt with in order to justify his political morality 
of freedom through liberty. As such his arguments are squarely 
in the tradition of positivistic analytic ·philosophy and his agenda 
is pitched at the level of how his justifications for coercion 
are analytically superior to those of a host of other analytic philo­
sophers. 
The closest that Raz comes to . acknowledging the horror that 
is law is when he admits that coercion is "evil"20 or when he suggests 
that: 
In a rough and ready way we can divide the ways in which a 
government controls and influences people into three. 
First, some accept its authority and obey its instructions because 
they are binding on them. Second, the government can and does 
manipulate the environment, physical, economic and social, in which 
people live. It constructs roads, flattens hills, digs canals, builds 
harbours, employs workers, contracts for services . In all these similar 
ways a government can exercise power and control over people 
without attempting thereby to exercise authority over them. Finally, 
a government controls people by providing remedies for breaches 
of laws and for the violation of people's rights .  People who are not 
subject to the authority of the law may then obey the rules for 
prudential reasons, or because even though they have no duty to 
obey, disobedience will do more harm than good.2 1  
But even here we must note the positioning and euphemistic way 
in which Raz . discusses state violence. It is placed last, suggesting 
its relative lack of importance. Moreover, it is characterized as 
"remedies" for breaches of law and violations of rights. There is 
a complete absence of context specificity here. There is zero 
discussion of what types of laws we are talking about; what and 
whose rights we are assuming; to whose benefit these laws (and 
consequently these remedies) accrue; the nature of these remedies; 
and who are the victims of these remedies. Fear of law is re-encoded 
as obedience for "prudential reasons", and the existential reality 
of violence is transformed into some rationalistic utilitarian calculus 
that "disobedience will do more harm than good." Too true. 
To be fair to Raz, he does in fact specifically devote ten pages 
to a direct discussion of coercion and I suppose, if we were to 
take Dworkin as our benchmark, we should be grateful that Raz 
20 Morality, 377. 
21 Morality, 1 03. 
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devotes 2.33 percent of his 429 page book to the issue.22 However, 
it is not coercion of itself that is Raz's concern, but rather its 
relationship to autonomy, and more particularly, the philosophical 
justificatory role autonomy plays in the anti-perfectionist scholarship 
of Robert Nozick, which Raz is keen to prove fallacious. Once 
again we encounter an exercise in avoidance. 
Raz approaches the issue of coercion by posing the following 
rhetorical question: 
Is there anything about coercion or its political use to justify anti­
perfectionism? 
Coercion is an evaluative term . While it has a fixed descriptive core, 
its meaning cannot be fully explained without noting its moral 
significance. I will adopt the following definition of coercion. 
P coerces Q into not doing act A only if 
A ( 1 )  P communicates to Q that h e  intends to bring about or 
have brought about some consequence, C, if Q does A. 
( 2) P makes this communication intending Q to believe that 
he does so in order to get Q not to do A .  
(3) That C will happen is, for Q, a reason of great weight for 
not doing A.  
(4) Q believes that i t  is  likely that P will bring about C i f  Q 
does A and that C would leave him worse off, having done 
A, than if he did not do A and P did not bring about C.  
(5)  Q does not do A .  
(6) Part of Q's reason for not doing A is to avoid (or to lessen) 
the likelihood of C by making it less likely that P will bring 
it about. 
B P's actions which conform to the conditions set out in A are 
prima facie wrong. 
C The fact that Q acted under those circumstances is a reason 
for not blaming him for not doing A. 
Only a communication meeting conditions A 1 -4 is a coercive threat.23 
To me, this is such a formulaic and philosophically clinical 
conception of coercion that it anaesthetizes us to the impact of 
what coercion, particularly by the state, is like. It is decontextual 
in that it gives no indication of the massive disparities in power 
between the coercer and the coerced. It is hypothetical rather than 
22 For some it may appear curious that I should attempt to quantify both 
Raz's ten page and Dworkin's five page account, and more seriously that 
it betrays a philosophical immaturity that focuses on quantity rather than 
quality . To be clear, I believe that the text of my essay addresses the issue 
of the quality of Dworkin and Raz's analyses, specifically in that it suggests 
interpretive voids; as to the quantity, I simply want to refute Galloway's 
proposition that either jurist provides an "extended analysis of the concept" 
[258). 
23 Morality, 1 4 8. 
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located and for that reason I consider it to be distracting. But none 
of this comes as a real surprise because, as Raz admits, his concern 
is not with a description of coercion, but its use as an evaluative 
term. As he puts it, "while (coercion) has a fixed descriptive core, 
its meaning cannot be fully explained without noting its full moral 
significance".24 In one sense I agree with this, for coercion un­
doubtedly has both descriptive and evaluative dimensions. Where 
I take issue with Raz is that he ignores completely any contextual 
descriptive discussion to focus solely on the evaluative element in 
the light of his theory of autonomy. The descriptive is acknowledged 
only to be immediately ignored in the pursuit of some more pressing 
philosophical agenda, his "aim . . . merely to tie the notion of 
coercion to a view about excuses".2s 
This reluctance to deal with the reality of coercion is confirmed 
several lines later when, reminiscent of Dworkin's strategy of 
avoidance, Raz posits that he only wants to focus on "coercion 
by threats" as "this is the form of coercion relevant to political 
theory".26 Who says? Who has the authority to determine the 
parameters of relevance of political theory? Is this not victory "by 
verbal legislation",27 to use one of Raz's more felicitous turns of 
phrase? This proposition may be true of the myopic agenda of 
liberal political theory, but is this not solipsistic tunnel vision? Might 
this be because the practice of coercion, as opposed to the threat, 
is simply too much for liberal theorists to bear, or is the practice 
of coercion so removed from their own privileged life experiences 
that they cannot comprehend it, or recognize its political and 
philosophical significance to those who are on the receiving end?28 
Moreover, the remainder of Raz's discussion proceeds to add insult 
to injury to those who are the victims of coercion, perhaps un­
intentionally (after all, they were never the intended audience of 
his book), for he argues that: 
24 Id 
These reflections on the moral significance of autonomy show that 
though coercion often, even usually, adversely affects people's well­
being it does not deserve the special importance attributed to it in 
much of liberal political thought unless one holds personal autonomy 
to be of very great value. But even if one does it is easy to exaggerate 
the evils of coercion, in comparison with other evils or misfortunes 
which may fall to people in their Iife.29 
25 Id. , 153. 
26 Id. , 149. 
27 Id., 166. 
28 I say this because I am somewhat baffled by the nature of enterprises by 
people such as Raz. How can someone whose biography reflects an Israeli 
background (See M. Levine "Forward" (1989), 62 Cal LR 731, 736) and 
who appears to support a Palestinian right to "self-determination" (Morality, 
207) systematically ignore the legalized violence of the Israeli state? 
29 Morality, 156. Raz repeats this claim in "Facing Up" (1989), 62 So. Cal 
LR 1153, 1232. 
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It is small comfort to be told that just because you can be harmed 
in other ways one should not become too preoccupied with the 
coercion that could put you away for the rest of your life, or may 
even terminate your life_3o 
But there is an even more nefarious side to this trivialization 
of state coercion that manifests itself towards the end of Raz's book. 
In an absolutely stunning - because so atypical - discussion of 
a specific problem Raz addresses the issues of the liberal state's 
response to "immigrant communities, or indigenous peoples, or . . .  
religious sects" that do not foster his vision of freedom, his 
perfectionist conception of "autonomy".3 1  Working on the unargued 
for, and I would suggest paternalistic, assumption "that their culture 
is inferior to that of the dominant liberal society in the midst of 
which they live"32 he opines that: 
[t]he perfectionist principles espoused in this book suggest that people 
[identity and culture unspecified] are justified in taking action to 
assimilate the minority group, at the cost of letting its culture die 
or at least be considerably changed by absorption.33 
And, as the remainder of the discussion makes clear, such assim­
ilation will not take place solely on the basis of acts of omission 
or failures by the state to support such diversity, but also by acts 
of commission deliberately designed to undercut those who resist 
the modes of educational incorporationism because, according to 
Raz, "[i]n such cases assimilationist policies may well be the only 
human course, even if implemented by force of law".34 Let me 
re-encode these comments in a more radical discourse. Should these 
religious, indigenous or immigrant communities not embrace the 
liberal Razian agenda, if they do not play by his rules, state power 
- read coercion - will be invoked to enforce his vision. Phrased 
less euphemistically, the victims and their value structure will be 
violently suppressed "by force of law". It is, indeed, ironic that 
Raz should pick this as his solitary contextual example for it betrays 
the limitations of his analysis confirming rather than refuting my 
own proposition that liberals, like Raz, pay little attention to the 
3° For a discussion of imprisonment practices and death squads in the Irish 
context see, for example, A.  Jennings (ed. ), Justice Under Fire: The Abuse 
of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland ( 1990); R.F. Devlin, "The Rule of Law 
and the Politics of Fear: Reflections on Northern Ireland" ( 1 992 )  Law and 
Critique (forthcoming); for a discussion of imprisonment rates for First 
Nations people in the Canadian context see M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives 
in Canada ( 1 988); for documentation of the racism of what is euphemistically 
called the "American justice system" in general, and in particular in the 
application of the death penalty, see (1988), 1 01 Harv. LR 14 7 5 and 
"Supreme Court: Leading Cases" (1987 ), 1 0  I Harv. LR 1 4 9. 
3 1  Morality, 423. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. , 424. 
34 Id. 
' 
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located and for that reason I consider it to be distracting. But none 
of this comes as a real surprise because, as Raz admits, his concern 
is not with a description of coercion, but its use as an evaluative 
term. As he puts it, "while (coercion) has a fixed descriptive core, 
its meaning cannot be fully explained without noting its full moral 
significance".24 In one sense I agree with this, for coercion un­
doubtedly has both descriptive and evaluative dimensions. Where 
I take issue with Raz is that he ignores completely any contextual 
descriptive discussion to focus solely on the evaluative element in 
the light of his theory of autonomy. The descriptive is acknowledged 
only to be immediately ignored in the pursuit of some more pressing 
philosophical agenda, his "aim . . . merely to tie the notion of 
coercion to a view about excuses".25 
This reluctance to deal with the reality of coercion is confirmed 
several lines later when, reminiscent of Dworkin's strategy of 
avoidance, Raz posits that he only wants to focus on "coercion 
by threats" as "this is the form of coercion relevant to political 
theory".26 Who says? Who has the authority to determine the 
parameters of relevance of political theory? Is this not victory "by 
verbal legislation",27 to use one of Raz's more felicitous turns of 
phrase? This proposition may be true of the myopic agenda of 
liberal political theory, but is this not solipsistic tunnel vision? Might 
this be because the practice of coercion, as opposed to the threat, 
is simply too much for liberal theorists to bear, or is the practice 
of coercion so removed from their own privileged life experiences 
that they cannot comprehend it, or recognize its political and 
philosophical significance to those who are on the receiving end?28 
Moreover, the remainder of Raz's discussion proceeds to add insult 
to injury to those who are the victims of coercion, perhaps un­
intentionally (after all, they were never the intended audience of 
his book), for he argues that: 
24 Id. 
These reflections on the moral significance of autonomy show that 
though coercion often, even usually, adversely affects people's well­
being it does not deserve the special importance attributed to it in 
much of liberal political thought unless one holds personal autonomy 
to be of very great value. But even if one does it is easy to exaggerate 
the evils of coercion, in comparison with other evils or misfortunes 
which may fall to people in their life.29 
25 Id, 153. 
26 Id., 149. 
27 Id., 1 66. 
28 I say this because I am somewhat baffled by the nature of enterprises by 
people such as Raz. How can someone whose biography reflects an Israeli 
background (See M. Levine "Forward" ( 1 989), 62 Cal LR 73 1 ,  736) and 
who appears to support a Palestinian right to "self-determination" (Morality, 
207) systematically ignore the legalized violence of the Israeli state? 
. 29 Morality, 156. Raz repeats this claim in "Facing Up" ( 1989), 62 So. Cal 
LR 1 1 53, 1 232. 
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It is small comfort to be told that just because you can be harmed 
in other ways one should not become too preoccupied with the 
coercion that could put you away for the rest of your life, or may 
even terminate your life.30 
But there is an even more nefarious side to this trivialization 
of state coercion that manifests itself towards the end of Raz's book. 
In an absolutely stunning - because so atypical - discussion of 
a specific problem Raz addresses the issues of the liberal state's 
response to "immigrant communities, or indigenous peoples, or . . .  
religious sects" that do not foster his vision of freedom, his 
perfectionist conception of "autonomy".3 1 Working on the unargued 
for, and I would suggest paternalistic, assumption "that their culture 
is inferior to that of the dominant liberal society in the midst of 
which they live"32 he opines that: 
[t]he perfectionist principles espoused in this book suggest that people 
[identity and culture unspecified] are justified in taking action to 
assimilate the minority group, at the cost of letting its culture die 
or at least be considerably changed by absorption.33 
And, as the remainder of the discussion makes clear, such assim­
ilation will not take place solely on the basis of acts of omission 
or failures by the state to support such diversity, but also by acts 
of commission deliberately designed to undercut those who resist 
the modes of educational incorporationism because, according to 
Raz, "[i]n such cases assimilationist policies may well be the only 
human course, even if implemented by force of law".34 Let me 
re-encode these comments in a more radical discourse. Should these 
religious, indigenous or immigrant communities not embrace the 
liberal Razian agenda, if they do not play by his rules, state power 
- read coercion - will be invoked to enforce his vision. Phrased 
less euphemistically, the victims and their value structure will be 
violently suppressed "by force of law". It is, indeed, ironic that 
Raz should pick this as his solitary contextual example for it betrays 
the limitations of his analysis confirming rather than refuting my 
own proposition that liberals, like Raz, pay little attention to the 
3° For a discussion of imprisonment practices and death squads in the Irish 
context see, for example, A. Jennings (ed.), Justice Under Fire: The Abuse 
of Civil Liberties in Northern Ireland ( 1990); R.F. Devlin, "The Rule of Law 
and the Politics of Fear: Reflections on Northern Ireland" (1992 ) Law and 
Critique (forthcoming); for a discussion of imprisonment rates for First 
Nations people in the Canadian context see M. Jackson, Locking Up Natives 
in Canada (1988); for documentation of the racism of what is euphemistically 
called the "American justice system" in general, and in particular in the 
application of the death penalty, see ( I  988), 101 Harv. LR 14 7 5  and 
"Supreme Court: Leading Cases" (1987 ), 101 Harv. LR 1 4 9. 
3 1  Morality, 423. 
32 Id. 
33 Id., 424. 
34 Id. 
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existential reality of coercion, subordinating it to the philosophical 
pursuit of their preferred perfectionist programme. 
For me, coercion is a horrific existential reality that we need 
to confront, acknowledge and decentre. Consequently, it is not 
simply a philosophical abstraction that can be subsumed and 
marginalized within an inquiry into the big philosophical question 
of the meaning of authority or trivialized by an interrogation of 
the limits of anti-perfectionism. Rather than seeking ways to 
legitimize coercion, my project is one of conscientization so as to 
seek to reduce and perhaps, in my more utopian moments, to even 
eliminate violence from our politico-juridical practices and therefore 
not require either Razian or Dworkinian exercises in legitimation. 
At the very minimum, I would hope to persuade scholars such as 
Raz and Dworkin that their automatic re-encoding of the issue 
of violence/ coercion as a sub issue of "the philosophical explanation 
of authority"35 is problematic and that they simply do not assume 
that theirs is the agenda, just because they have always done it 
that way.36 
Perhaps, then, the worst that can be said is that critics like myself 
and mainstream theorists like Dworkin and Raz are simply operating 
within two different interpretive frameworks and that when our 
conversations do overlap we are at cross purposes. But what is 
surprising is that Galloway does not pick up on this difference 
between advocates of the nonradical agenda and myself, given that 
35 Id., 63. 
36 There is one other occasion in which Raz devotes significant space to the 
issue of coercion and, on first read, this would appear to dovetail with rather 
than ignore my concerns about coercion. Toward the end of the book, in 
a discussion of his reinterpretation of autonomy and harm, he posits: 
And yet the harm principle is defensible in the light of the principle 
of autonomy for one simple reason. The means used, coercive inter­
ference, violates the autonomy of its victim. First, it violates the 
condition of independence and expresses a relation of domination and 
an attitude of disrespect for the coerced individual. Second, coercion 
by criminal penalties is a global and indiscriminate invasion of 
autonomy. Imprisoning a person prevents him from almost all auto­
nomous pursuits. Other forms of coercion may be less severe, but 
they all invade autonomy, and they all, at least in this world, do it 
in a fairly indiscriminate way. That is, there is no practical way of 
ensuring that the coercion will restrict the victims' choice of repugnant 
options but will not interfere with their other choices. A moral theory 
which values autonomy highly can justify restricting the autonomy 
of one person for the sake of the greater autonomy of others or even 
of that person himself in the future. That is why it can justify coercion 
to prevent harm, for harm interferes with autonomy. But it will not 
tolerate coercion for other reasons [Morality, 418.]. 
But the important point is that his concerns about coercion are that they 
infringe his concept of autonomy, but autonomy, like everything else in 
his book, is first and foremost a philosophical concept, the reality of being 
a victim of coercion relegated to a second order derivative experience. 
190 Windsor Yearbook of Access to Justice 1991 
he was one of the supervisors for my graduate thesis upon which 
this article was based. But perhaps this suggests that liberals and 
radicals are not only of different traditions, but that even when we 
do use similar discourses we are operating in different hermeneutical 
circles. As Colleen Sheppard reminds us, "[d]ifferent realities may 
give different meanings to the same words".37 To conjecture further, 
that difference might be between what Antonio Gramsci calls 
"organic intellectuals"38 and "professional philosophers".39 
The problem that I want to emphasize in Galloway's portrayal 
of my critical position is that he re-encodes my interpretation of 
liberal analysis in a manner that suggests a lack of academic integrity 
on my part, which is a serious intellectual charge, when the difference 
is one of stance and commitment. The accusatory nature of his 
· argument betrays a presumption on his part that there are fun­
damentally correct interpretations, and that those who take a 
different track must be acting in academic bad faith. The reason 
why I have had to spend an unconscionably large amount of this 
article elaborating on my own position is to illustrate that to be 
different is not necessarily to be defective. 
Galloway's second alleged example of what he calls "misrepre­
sentation" [258] is Allan Hutchinson's suggestion that Dworkin's 
"fraternal community .. . amounts to the very Lockean social 
contract of the conditional kind that Dworkin is at pains to discredit 
and disclaim".40 Galloway rejects Hutchinson's interpretation on 
the basis that Dworkin is precise in his analysis in that his idea 
of community "embodies the idea that associative obligations can 
be voluntarily incurred, as opposed to the idea that obligations can 
only be voluntarily incurred, which is the idea that underlies social 
contract theory" [258]. Having emphasized this distinction Galloway 
posits that Hutchinson equates the two, and that this is "an egregious 
misrepresentation" [25 8 ]. 
Professor Hutchinson and I have discussed this critique by 
Galloway, and it seems to me that it is perhaps appropriate to 
allow Hutchinson to speak for himself:4 1 
At least 5 blunt comments come to mind. First, there is nothing 
clear about this supposed distinction, it seems the usual display of 
Dworkinian sophistry. Secondly, insofar as I understand the distinc­
tion, it hardly meets, let alone defeats, the assessment made by 
Hutchinson. Thirdly, even allowing the distinction (which I do not), 
a misreading of it hardly amounts to an "example of egregious 
37 "The I and the It" in Perspectives, supra note 6, 4 1 7. 
38 A. Gramsci, "The Intellectuals" in Selections from Prison Notebooks (197 1 ), 
5 .  
39 S. Burton describes Raz's "Law as Practical Reason" (1 988), So. Cal LR 
747, 750. 
40 Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold (1988), 73. 
4 1  These conversations took place at the Learned Societies Conference, Queen's 
University at Kingston, June, 1 99 1 ,  and the following paragraph is from 
a letter by Professor Hutchinson dated August 19,  1 99 1 .  Copy on file with 
author. 
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misrepresentation." If this is the best Galloway can do by way of 
example, he is skating on very thin ice. Fourthly, he assumes that 
my conclusion is an interpretation rather than a criticism. The purpose 
of my conclusion was to complete an analysis that sought to show 
that, whatever Dworkin thought or said he was doing, a close 
examination of the substance of his views disclosed a very different 
theory. Simply because a writer calls herself an X does not mean 
that she is one. Is it conclusive that, because someone says that 
"I am not a racist", they are not one? Finally, Galloway seems to 
engage in intellectual exchange by bold assertion and allegation; 
there is no attempt at argument or explanation. He seems to think 
that, because he claims something is so (i.e. Dworkin means this 
not that), then it is so. This is an exercise in dogma, not in scholarship. 
Like any writer, Dworkin's ideas must be read in a reasonable light. 
In the same way that one must not always read them in the worst 
light, one must not always read them in the best light. Legal theory 
is about critical debate, not blind allegiance or wilful hostility. 
For good meas�re and, I suppose, to illustrate the pervasiveness 
of the nasty critical habit of misrepresentation, Galloway points 
to a comment of Pamela Chapman which indicates that Dworkin 
adopts a "normative natural law theory" that attempts to "establish 
guidelines and sources for legal reasoning, that avoid 'political' 
choices yet are determinative of the appropriate outcomes".42 
Yet again Galloway champions the Dworkinian project but also 
in problematic ways. First, again there is the problem of contex­
tualism. The sentences to which Galloway refers are in the intro­
duction to Chapman's essay, but the substantive discussion which 
elaborates upon her proposition comes several pages later at 87 1 -
873. Second, Galloway's rhetorical exclamation, "Poor Dworkin!" 
(25 8], appears to deny that there is any legitimate foundation upon 
which to conceive of Dworkin as a natural lawyer, but surely this 
is at least a possible interpretation given that as recently as 1 982, 
just four years before Chapman published her article, Dworkin 
himself opined: 
If the crude description of natural law I just gave is correct, that 
any theory which makes the content of law sometimes depend on 
the correct answer to some moral question is a natural law theory, 
then I am guilty of natural law . . . .  Suppose this is natural law. 
What in the world is wrong with it?43 
Viewed in this light Galloway seems to have a breathtakingly broad 
conception of "misrepresentation". 
Third, Galloway's main concern with Chapman's proposition, 
however, is that it posits that Dworkin believes in the separation 
of law and politics, and that legal decision-making is "apolitical". 
Galloway's response, drawing on Dworkin's thesis in Taking Rights 
42 P. Chapman, "The Politics of Judging: Section 1 of the Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms" (1 986), 24 Osgoode Hall LJ. 867, 368. 
43 R. Dworkin, "Natural Law Revisited" (1982), 34 U. fla. LR l 65 (emphasis 
in original). 
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Seriously that legal decision-making should be based upon principles 
and not policies, argues that such principles are principles of political 
morality and therefore are manifestly political. This is assumed by 
Galloway to be a refutation of Chapma11's critical interpretation. 
But once again Galloway may be too hasty in his accusation. First, 
as I have pointed out, Chapman does have a substantive discussion 
of Dworkin several pages into her essay and explicitly deals with 
the principles/policy distinction, rejecting its aspirations.44 Second, 
it should be noted that Chapman places "political" in inverted 
commas, clearly suggesting that "political" is a loaded concept. 
It may be true that Dworkin considers that judges, when making 
decisions, are acting on the basis of principles of political morality, 
but it is also equally clear that he has a narrower conception of 
"the political"; that is, decision-making in its legislative form which 
he argues is not characteristic of - nor appropriate for - the 
judiciary.45 Thus, it should be clear that the dispute depends upon 
one's understanding of the nature of the concept "political". There­
fore, perhaps Chapman's portrayal refers to Dworkin's narrower 
conception of the separation of legal decision-making from political 
decision making, which is, in my opinion, a legitimate, if not 
necessarily a universally accepted, reading of Dworkin's thesis. Thus, 
perhaps Galloway's defence of "Poor Dworkin" and his onslaught 
on Pamela Chapman is a little too quick and easy, premised as 
it is upon a traditionalist and constrained conception of politics. 
If I am correct that Galloway's allegations of misrepresentation 
are unfounded, if I have dispelled concerns about the academic 
integrity of the critical agenda, if he is quite simply wrong in his 
accusations, then I think it is fair for those of us who have been 
challenged to ask why these charges have been levelled. 
The answer, I suggest, is to be found in several comments that 
pepper the first few pages of his commentary. Galloway posits that 
the crits believe mainstream jurisprudence to be "so defective as 
to not merit serious consideration" [255]; "that they have used a 
number of strategies . . .  to dissuade people from exploring in depth 
or taking seriously the writing of nonradical theorists" [256], or 
that "it would be a travesty if students or potential readers were 
dissuaded from reading them" [259] because of the various crit 
"misrepresentations". I believe these propositions by Galloway 
reveal more than liberals may want to admit. Galloway seems to 
be driven by a fear that on the basis of these radical interpretations 
mainstream scholarship will lose part of its readership. Viewed more 
cynically, his concern seems to be that perhaps the liberals will 
lose their hegemonic position within the curriculum of the legal 
academy, that their capacity for determining the parameters of the 
discourse will be destabilized. If this is an accurate unpacking of 
Galloway's text, then his reaction is something more than mere 
"scholarly interchange" as he portrays it [256]. Rather, it confirms 
44 Supra note 42, 872. 
45 See, for example, Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977), 82. 
f 
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a key tenet of the critical agenda: the proposition that legal education 
is a terrain of political contestation and that scholarship, in spite 
of its pretensions, is always and already predetermined by politics. 
Moreover, it seems to me that Galloway's concern about the 
blinkering of students and other potential readers by the critical 
commentary underestimates the capacity of these people to think 
for themselves. Students of legal theory are neither dupes nor 
automatons who passively accept what they are provided by the 
professorate. In my experience, especially when one introduces 
students to critical, feminist or race analyses, students frequently 
demand and seek out liberal perspectives on these issues. As good 
lawyers, they · want to encounter both sides of the debate. The 
proposition that students might uncritically accept the critical 
perspective fails to pay full respect to the intellectual and inter­
rogative strengths of the student body, and simultaneously under­
estimates the depth of the liberal mindframe of the vast majority 
of those who go through higher education in North America. 
b) Absence of Consideration 
By this, Galloway seems to mean that the crits fail to give a 
full account of the variety of mainstream analyses of law. Spe­
cifically, he complains that the primary focus of the critical analysis 
is on what he variously calls "functionalist", "instrumentalist" or 
"evolutionary functionalist" [259] thereby ignoring "nonfunction­
alist" mainstream accounts of law. As far as I can make out, by 
"nonfunctionalist" Galloway seems to be contemplating those who 
"debate about the nature of law", those who inquire "what is law", 
those who, quoting Les Green, posit that "law is not distinguished 
by what it does, but how it does it". Tying these nebulous ideas 
together, Galloway suggests he is talking about the work of those 
like - you guessed it - Dworkin, Raz and Hart because "they 
recognize what has escaped the crits . . .  that a complete theory 
of law and political theory must include some analysis of law's 
uniqueness, and some account of its form" [259]. 
I think that Galloway touches upon an interesting question here 
- the tendency for crits to disengage their analyses from those 
of the dominant discourse - which I will come back to a little 
later. At this stage, I wish to address some problems in relation 
to the way he develops his critique. 
First, it is not totally clear to me what he means by "evolutionary 
functionalist" accounts and it would help if he had provided examples · 
of mainstream scholarship that manifest this approach and of critical 
responses to it.46 More specifically, Galloway is of course correct 
to posit that functionalist analyses of law suffer from fundamental 
weaknesses - mainstream social science taught us that a long time 
ago - but this only complements the crits for they have been at 
46 The closest he comes to providing us with guidance is to refer us to Robert 
Gordon, a crit, and his essay "Critical Legal Histories" (1984), 36 Stan. 
LR 57. 
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pains to emphasize the weakness of mainstream legal analyses that 
operate on functionalist assumptions.47 However, the looseness of 
Galloway's conception of functionalism causes him problems be­
cause his propositions that "Raz and Dworkin reject functionalist 
accounts of law" [259] suggests that their analyses are purged of 
any "instrumentalist" elements, that they do not touch the question 
of, in Green's terms, "the uses to which law may be put". But 
surely this is a partial reading of their work. Take Raz for example. 
As Stephen Perry48 points out, Raz's earlier book, The Authority 
of Law is very clear that law's primary function is to provide "publicly 
ascertainable ways of guiding behaviour and regulating aspects of 
social life".49 Moreover, it is to be noted that Raz does not reject 
this functionalist characterization of aspects of his work when he 
replies to Perry in "Facing Up". Indeed, Raz explicitly adopts the 
discourse of "the functions of law"50 and indeed, contra Galloway, 
argues that "(o)ur understanding of law is greatly defective unless 
it includes and is based on a sound view of the role of law in 
pr�ctical reasoning. The first precept of legal theory is that law 
is practical, that its essential function is to play a role in its subjects' 
reasoning about what to do".5 1  Moreover, it is difficult to comprehend 
how Galloway fails to recognize the instrumentalist aspects of the 
Morality of Freedom given that the book is touted by Neil Mac­
Cormick (who Galloway quotes at page 261 )  as a "transition from 
analysis to advocacy".52 Specifically, it seems to me that Raz's 
proposition that the law and state should promote perfectionist 
policies that will facilitate the development of individual well being 
and autonomy53 is hardly devoid of instrumentalist connotations. 
My point here is quite simple. It is that though the primary focus 
of scholars such as Raz may not be on "the uses to which law 
may be put" [259] their analyses of the "how" of law are premised 
upon certain, at least instrumental, assumptions as to the desirable 
social function of law. If this is so, then Galloway himself has failed 
at the very minimum to give sufficient consideration to those whose 
work he advocates or, perhaps more disturbingly, he has provided 
a selective reading of their work. 
Furthermore, Galloway speculates, not for the first time in the 
essay, that crits reckon that the mainstream approaches are "wholly 
unimportant, and not worthy of serious consideration" [259]. This, 
I suggest either misunderstands or demonstrates a lack of familiarity 
with the extensive critical literature. Hart has received some critical 
47 See for example, M. Feinman "Critical Approaches to Contract Law" ( 1983), 
30 U.CLA. 819. 
48 "Second Order Reasons, Uncertainty and Legal Theory" (1988), So. Cal. 
L.R. 913, 950. 
49 The Authority of law (1979), 51. 
50 Supra note 29, 1201. 
5 1  Id., 1154. 
52 Preface: Symposium, supra note 18, 743, 744. 
53 Morality, 19 . 
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analysis54 and Dworkin has been the focus of several challenges 
by critical scholars.55 More generally, the accusation that the crits 
posit that mainstream scholarship is not "worthy of serious con­
sideration" [259] is not supported by any examples of critical claims 
to this effect. To the contrary, crits spend a great deal of their 
time critiquing liberalism both internally and externally, because 
it is so important as an ideological practice. In part, this may be 
why crits find it so difficult to articulate their reconstructive agenda: 
they are continually trying to keep up with the cottage industry 
that is called mainstream legal theory. This extensive critical focus 
on the limits of liberalism makes crits an easy target for Galloway's 
criticism that they are "negative postmodernists" [262]. Thus, crits 
are dammed if they do and dammed if they don't. If they focus 
their critical skills on liberalism they are nihilists, if they pursue 
their own agenda they are missing the (liberal) boat. This then 
points to the deeper issue of who controls the discursive agenda, 
who gets to determine what is important? Viewed in this light, 
Galloway's essay is an attempt to maintain the discursive hegemony 
of the nonradical elit�, all others being supplicants for inclusion 
in a pre-structured and constraining liberal discourse. 
Finally, under this rubric of absence of consideration, let me briefly 
address Galloway's proposition, drawing heavily on Les Green, that 
the key distinction of "nonfunctionalist" accounts of law is that 
they provide "some analysis of law's uniqueness, and some account 
of its form" as preliminaries to "a serious inquiry into the general 
relationship between law and politics" [259-260]. The suggestion, 
of course, is that these intricacies escape the crit. Once again it 
is the old story of the higher lights being crassly misunderstood 
by the pedants. But this betrays a misunderstanding of the critical 
position. Galloway is correct to suggest that crits do not believe 
that law is unique, because to focus exclusively on "how it does 
it" is, from a critical perspective, to reify law,56 to disconnect it 
from the vagaries - both individual and collective - of human 
agency, to shift the spotlight from legal actors onto some phenome­
nological fiction called "Law". This is considered to be an exercise 
in the institutionalization of irresponsibility.57 But this does not mean 
54 See for example, F. de Coste, "Radical Discourse in Legal Theory: Hart 
and Dworkin" (1989), 21 Ottawa LR 679; J. Singer, "The Player and the 
Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory" (1984), 94 Yale LJ 1, 28; S. Fish, 
"Force" (1988), 45 Washington and Lee LR 883; P. Goodrich, "Adventures 
of Legal Meaning, Herbert Hart and Legal Subjectivism" in Legal Discourse 
(1987), 44. 
55 M. Feinman, Book Review (1977), 91 Harv. LR 302; A.C. Hutchinson, 
"Indiana Dworkin and Law's Empire" (1987), 86 Yale LJ. 637; J. Boyle, 
"Legal Fiction" (1986-87), 38 Hastings LJ. I O  13; R. Cotterrall, "Liberalism's 
Empire: Reflections on Ronald Dworkin's Legal Philosophy" (1987), Am. 
B.F. Res. J 509; F. de Coste, supra note 54. 
56 P. Gabel, "Reification in Legal Reasoning" (1980), 3 Research in Law and 
Sociology, 3 5. 
57 M.J. Mossman, "Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes" 
(1986), 3 Aust. J. L and S. 30. 
f 
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that crits do not focus on the specificities of law, that they do not 
take seriously its special modalities of politics.58 Rather, crits have 
been at pains to emphasize that the form of law is perhaps one 
of its most politically significant and problematic elements.59 But 
again, this is not a quest to find some "general relationship between 
law and politics" [260] because such a quest is inconsistent with 
one of the central theses of radical thought at least since Marx, 
that of historical contingency. As to the relationship between law 
and politics, there can be no general theory, no super explanation, 
because the nature of the relationship is exactly that, relational 
and contextual; it is dependent upon a multitude of social, economic 
and cultural factors such as class, race, gender etc. As these elements 
mutate, so too does the nature of the relationship between law and 
politics. This is called "the relative autonomy thesis".60 
c) Reductionism and 
d) Absence of Discrimination 
Not only are "reductionism" and "absence of discrimination", 
as Galloway points out, two sides of the one coin, they are also 
specific manifestations of his prior and more general complaint 
of an absence of consideration. His basic concern here seems to 
be that in so far as crits have posited that the cause of our ills 
is "liberalism", they have developed a philosophically unsophis­
ticated caricature that fails to do justice to liberalism as an 
"intellectual tradition". If accurate, such a criticism would, I believe, 
be important. However, again Galloway misdirects his critical gaze. 
Although Galloway may be correct to point out that Unger's 
characterization of liberalism may be too broad as a conception 
of liberal political and legal philosophy, that position was taken 
in 1 975,61 and a much more subtle and significantly revised account 
is provided in Unger's most recent work, Politics ( 1 987). But even 
this does not justify Galloway's stance for he appears to not fully 
realize the full impact of what he acknowledges in passing - the 
central point that Unger was making - that liberalism is much 
more than an academic philosophical tradition - which is, to a 
significant degree, Galloway's position - that it is a weltanschauung, 
that is, a deep seated and pervasive cultural ideology that extends 
far beyond and deeper than the academy. This is a point I shall 
return to later. 
Furthermore Unger, though an important influence within the 
crits, is also somewhat atypical in the breadth of his vision and 
58 See, for example, A.C. Hutchinson's contribution to Perspectives, "Crits and 
Cricket: A Deconstructive Spin (Or was it a Googly?)" 181. 
59 See, for example, D. Kennedy, "Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication" (1976), 89 Harv. L Rev. 1685. 
60 This point is dealt with, to some extent, in my article, "Law's Centaur's 
. . .  ", supra note 8, 230, 249. 
61 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, Knowledge and Politics (1975), Chapt. 2. 
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ambitions. While he is first and foremost a social theorist, most 
crits - perhaps in spite of themselves - are lawyers. As a result, 
their primary concern tends not to be liberalism more generally, 
but a particular historically and institutionally specific (and perhaps 
excessively doctrinal) subcomponent of that tradition, what they 
sometimes call "liberal legalism". Karl Klare, for example, argues 
that: 
"Liberal legalism" is a particular historical incarnation of the legalist 
outlook, which characteristically serves as the philosophical foun­
dation of the legitimacy of the legal order in capitalist societies. 
Its essential features are the commitment to general, democratically 
promulgated rules, the equal treatment of all citizens before the law, 
and the radical separation of morals, politics, and personality from 
judicial action. Liberal legalism also consists of a complex of social 
practices and institutions that complement and elaborate upon its 
underlying political philosophy and jurisprudence. With respect to 
its modern Anglo-American form, these include adherence to prece­
dent, separation of the legislative (prospective) and the judicial 
(retrospective) functions, the obligations to formulate legal rules on 
a general basis (the notion of ratio decidendi), adherence to complex 
procedural formalities, and the search for specialized methods of 
analysis ("legal reasoning"). All of these institutions are designed 
to serve the fundamental desideratum of separation of morals, politics, 
and personal bias from adjudication."62 
With this in mind, it is interesting to note that when Galloway 
attempts to trace the parameters of the crit conception of liberalism, 
he does not draw on the work of any critical scholar, but instead 
reproduces a conception contrived by an anti-crit,63 Les Green, which 
in turn is unsupported by any references except an unhelpful one 
"culled from American law reviews".64 To me this is problematic 
for crits have characterized liberalism in a variety of different ways 
in a variety of different contexts,· depending upon the forum, the 
audience and more generally, authorial intent. Contextualism is 
62 K. Klare, "Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins 
of Modern Legal Consciousness, 193 7 - 194 1 "  (197 8), 62 Minn. LR 2 65, 
2 7 6 and footnotes therein. 
63 The proposition that Green is an anti-crit is based upon his self-perceived 
provocative lumping of the crits with marxists, feminists et al. in the category 
of "functionalists". See his "The Political Context of Legal Theory", supra 
note 5, 2 & 12. 
64 "Un-American Liberalism: Raz's Morality of Freedom" ( 19 88), 3 8  U. T.LJ. 
317 . This self confessed caricature goes as follows: 
"Liberals are atomists who think that the individual is prior to society . 
They prize freedom as the negative virtue of being left to pursue one's 
own good in one's own way. Their political morality is based on 
individual rights and equality and has the function of regulating 
competition among self-interested atoms. Liberals recognize a narrow 
role for the state, which may restrict liberty only to prevent harm 
to others and must remain neutral among competing conceptions of 
the good life ." Id 
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important and I think that it is only fair to let crits speak for 
themselves rather than ventriloquise through a hostile commentator. 
This is particularly true when Galloway posits that crits present 
liberalism as "a canonical static dogma" (260). Quite simply: where 
is the reference? 
On my understanding, crits have a significantly more sophisticated 
understanding of liberalism than a mere dogma, although at times 
some liberals come pretty close to it.65 I think that crits66 recognize 
that liberalism has had a venerable history, that it has played a 
crucial role in freeing western society from the repressive shackles 
of a feudalistic state and church and that it has taken us in a 
significant direction towards the achievement of equality. However, 
the critical belief is that it has stalled in its litJerationist agenda. 
Restated, crits comprehend liberalism contextually and dynamically, 
through the prisms of history and power. Liberalism has taken on 
a political mythical quality that transcends even the best intentions 
and most .progressive practices of those who are its academic 
defenders. Even if liberal theorists once controlled the agenda of 
liberalism, they no longer do so in the rich North Atlantic societies 
because through the 1 970's and 1 980's they have been supplanted 
by the ideology of "fundamentalist liberalism", particularly as it 
is espoused by corporations and the New Right. Thus, in so far 
as liberals continue to seek to carve out a corner of a field that 
has been occupied by those who are manifestly more powerful than 
a cabal of abstractionist academics, they will ultimately and in spite 
of themselves legitimize an oppressive political order. Raz is as 
good an example of this as any, in that he is willing to confer 
the status of a "right holder" on corporations67 without in any way 
seriously addressing how in a late capitalist society corporate power 
rather than state power may be the primary threat to individual 
autonomy. 
Galloway's response would probably be that all of this misses 
the point because liberalism as a politico-ideological practice is 
not what he is talking about, but liberalism as a philosophical 
tradition. This is a point I will return to later, but his key suggestion 
here is that there are philosophers in this tradition who do not 
fit the picture portrayed of them by the crits (whatever that might 
be). Once again, he draws on the recent work of Raz to refute 
the proposition that liberalism has any core shibboleths. Specifically, 
65 See for example, B. Schwartz, First Principles, Second Thoughts: Aboriginal 
Peoples, Constitutional Reform and Canadian Statecraft (1986). 
66 A caveat is appropriate here. Given the generic nature of Galloway's criticism 
of "the crits", I feel obliged to respond on a similar level. This may be 
impossible given that those who self identify with the critical legal studies 
movement are highly diversified and it would be very difficult to discover 
an official "crit position" on any issue. So what follows is perhaps more 
of a generalization than I might want to make, but is to some degree dictated 
by the nature of Galloway's approach. 
67 Morality, 1 76. 
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although Galloway admits that leading liberals such as Rawls and 
Dworkin have promoted "at least some of (the) ideas" (which 
ones?) of "radical individualism, a rights based morality and a 
neutral state" [26 1 ], he also argues that Raz "explodes the myth 
of their definitional centrality" [26 1 ]. I, for one, am unclear 
as to the epistemological status of the idea of "definitional cen­
trality" and that may be because of my own ignorance of the 
internal norms of contemporary analytic philosophy. But it certainly 
does not mean that these same ideas are not of crucial ideological 
significance, which is the crit claim, because just a few lines later 
Galloway admits that Raz considers "respect due to individual 
liberty" as being "the specific contribution of the liberal tradition 
to political morality."68 So, in spite of everything, "individualism" 
and "liberty" remain central. Why then are the crits so off the 
mark? 
Galloway's response, reporting Raz's position, is as slippery as 
it is unhelpful. His claim is that there is no essential essence attri­
buted to "liberty" in the liberal tradition, that there are a variety 
of different conceptions of liberty. For Galloway, Raz "ex­
plodes (the) myth (of crit reductionism) with finesse" [26 1 ]. I 
continue to have some problems with this claim. First, and perhaps 
least importantly, I am disturbed by the violence of Galloway's 
discourse. Second, Galloway conveniently drops the element of 
"individual" out of the debate focusing solely on the question 
of liberty.69 Third, Galloway's confession of polysemy in fact 
acknowledges the accuracy of one of the central theses of the 
crits, the "indeterminacy thesis". What is it then about liberalism 
that makes it a tradition "of a considerable degree of unity 
and continuity" ,70 if its core concept of "liberty" is essentially 
contested even by the faithful, and individualism seems to 
have been dropped, at least by Galloway. Why hang onto liber­
alism, then, for crits and marxists also have conceptions of 
liberty, the individual and the role of the state and the desir­
able nature of the relationship between them? Does the inde­
terminacy thesis therefore convert marxists and crits into 
liberals in spite of themselves, or, perhaps more interestingly, 
does it make Raz a reluctant crit? There are of course a mul­
titude of reasons as to why Raz would refuse to be a crit but one 
might be because he is conscious of the fact that being a philo­
sopher means more than being heir to a tradition; that philosophy 
is a form of political practice, and that being a liberal academic 
remains an acceptable - even laudable - perhaps harmless -
68 Morality, 2. 
69 Raz's strategy is somewhat different. As I read him, Raz seems to distinguish 
"autonomy-oriented conception of personal well being" from "moral in­
dividualism", building his perfectionist theory on the former rather than 
the latter. Morality, 16; 427. 
70 Morality, 1.  
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position in the eyes of the power elite, but that being a crit is 
threatening.7 1 
None of this, of course, is to deny the banal point made by 
Galloway that there are important differences between liberals that 
crits fail to discern. Of course there are, in the same way that there 
are fundamentally important differences between crits, people of 
colour, First Nations peoples and feminists. Of course there is a 
difference between Dworkin's internal "interpretive" methodology 
and Raz 's external72 "normative-explanatory" approach [263 ]. But 
are we really meant to carefully dissect every new publication that 
comes out of the Clarendon Press? Are we forever meant to play 
catch up with the latest twists and turns of what even Galloway 
admits to be the "dry", "excessively abstract", "inspirationless", 
"turgid", "pedantic" and complex movements of analytical phi­
losophy [255]? Are we to forever to make our jurisprudential 
pilgrimages to the Mecca that is called Oxford, and then be pilloried 
as ignorant . heretics when we miss the newest messiah? Raz may 
be Galloway's newest guru, but it is the same old method. 
It is not that Raz's recent book is the only jurisprudential event 
of the mid to late 1 980's. In my opinion, there was a lot more 
to which the crits had to pay attention. First, it was at about this 
time that the energy that had sustained the crits for an amazingly 
prolific decade began to wane. In part, I think, this was because 
some of the leading figures in the movement had said a great deal 
of what they wanted to say - dead horses and all that - and 
were in a period of reconsideration as to where they wanted to 
go.73 In part, there was the emergence of a new generation of crits 
who were unsure as to how they wanted to develop their analyses. 
Second, it was about this time when the academic hatchet began 
to fall, when the liberal legal academy began to get nervous of 
the critical intervention and exclude crits or deny them tenure. This, 
7 1 There is a further point here. I am not even sure if the idea of "respect 
due to individual liberty" is liberalism's specific contribution, because 
frequently Raz's discussion of liberty verges on some "dignitarian" conception 
of the "self' and if this is an accurate interpretation then this fits with 
the basic tenets of the Judeo-Christian tradition, at least when viewed in 
its best light, and that predates liberalism. All this, of course, is difficult 
to get an angle on because the disengaged nature of Razian thought provides 
us with little by way of specifics. 
72 As an aside, it always baffles me how legal theorists can posit an external 
position when they have spent the entirety of their adult life entrenched 
in an enclave that systematically enforces a sign system and mode of thinking 
that, intentionally or unintentionally, excludes the reality of otherness. For 
further discussions of the ideological dimension of the legal educational 
environment see, for example, W. Conklin, "A Contract" Perspectives 207; 
M. O'Brien and S. McIntyre, "Patriarchal Hegemony and Legal Education" 
(1986), 2 CJ W.L 69; M. Maloney and J. Cassels, "Critical Legal Education: 
Paralysis with a Purpose" (1989), 4 CJLS. 99. 
73 The exception is, of course, Unger's three volumes of Politics. For a discussion 
see my "On the Road to Radical Reform" ( l  990), Osgoode Hall LJ. 641. 
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I think, came as a rude awakening to some crits, in spite of their 
comprehension of the politics of legal education.74 Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, there were the emergence of the feminist crit­
icisms,75 and the so called "minority critiques" of the crits,76 and 
these, I believe, hit the crits very hard. It is with these issues of 
race and gender that the crits have preoccupied themselves,77 and 
not with a text such as The Morality of Freedom that assiduously 
avoids any concrete encounter with such issues. None of this is 
intended as an apology for not reading Raz, it is just a contextual 
explanation as to why not everyone's universe is shattered by what 
is in many ways a very · traditional jurisprudential text. 
e) The presentation of Mainstream Theory as an Instrument of 
legitimation 
Galloway makes a variety of claims under this rubric including 
that crits assume, that "liberal theory is the motive force that is 
presented to justify capitalism, or our hierarchical and patriarchal 
institutions" [263-264 ]; or that "the language of rights, being 
individualist in orientation .. . should itself be abandoned if true 
political ideals are to be attained" [264] and finally, that "phi­
losophical debate is ideological warfare well concealed under a 
rational cloak . . . Liberal theory . . . is but propaganda" [264]. 
Once again, it seems to me that Galloway is somewhat off the 
mark. 
The first and last of these accusations incorporates an instru­
mentalist conception of ideology suggesting that the crits subscribe 
to some vulgar conspiracy thesis that liberal academic philosophers 
are but apparatchi of the power elites. I do not demand that Galloway 
pursue the extensive and careful left literature, and the important 
debates that go on therein, as to the nature and processes of ideology. 
I do wish, however, that once again he would directly quote critical 
scholars on their conception of ideology rather than another non-
74 Mark Tushnet once said, "When they find out what we are up to they 
will come after us with guns". Coercion and oppression will not always 
be this direct. 
75 See for example, C. MacKinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory of the State 
( 1989), 290, footnote 1 8. 
76 See for example, "Minority Critiques of the CLS Movement" (1 987), 22 
Harv. C.RC.LLR, 297. 
77 Moreover, it has taken the crits some time to come to terms with these 
criticisms for they have not adopted the liberal assimilationist strategy of 
"add women/people of colour and stir" and as a result the response has 
been slow in forthcoming. For some early responses see, M. Tushnet, "Rights: 
An Essay in Informal Political Theory" ( 1 987), 1 7  Pol and Soc'y 403; 
A. Freeman, "Racism, Rights and the Quest for Equality of Opportunity: 
A Critical Legal Essay" (1988), 23 Harv. C.RC.LLR 295; M.J. Horwitz, 
"Rights" (1 988), 23 Harv. C.RC.LLR 393. For later responses, see, D. 
Kennedy "A Cultural Pluralist Case for Affirmative Action in Legal 
Academia" (1990), Duke LJ. 705; G. Peller, "Race Consciousness" (1990), 
Duke LJ 758. 
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crit, Donald Brosnan.78 My only point is that ideology is much more 
entrenched, sophisticated and pervasive than conspiracy theses 
suggest;79 that it is deeply embedded in our ways of knowing80, 
perhaps unconscious though not necessarily falsely conscious; it .  
is part of the interpretive framework through which we comprehend 
our understanding of the world, our relationships and ourselves. 
On this reading, the critical proposition derives from the marxist 
aphorism that "social being determines consciousness", thereby 
suggesting that there is nothing necessarily intentionally apologetic 
in the work of liberal theorists - although it would be foolish 
to deny that this sometimes happens, when it does81 - but that 
they are simply giving voice to their conception of reality, based 
on their socially constructed lived experiences. Therefore, I suppose 
that Galloway is correct in that crits see political theory as a form 
of ideological warfare, but this is because crits do not buy into 
the liberal assumption that ideology per se is a bad thing, for they 
see it as an. inescapable inevitability of being. The more interesting 
question, from the critical vantage point, is whether a particular 
ideological position advances progressive politics or impedes them. 
This leads me to Galloway's second point, the claim that crits 
posit that "the language of rights should be abandoned if true political 
ideals are to be attained" [264 ]. Two thoughts come to mind here. 
First, this seems to me to manifest what Galloway accuses the crits 
of: reductionism, an absence of consideration and a failure to 
discriminate. The position that rights are individualist in orientation 
and therefore should be jettisoned has been extremely controversial 
within the critical community, and many have argued for a re­
constructive extension of the discourse of rights.82 Second, I do not 
believe that crits as a collective subscribe to the idea of "true political 
ideals" for they consider that the invocation of standards of truth, 
with its connotations of naturalism and inevitability, has historically 
operated as a form of political and philosophical closure thereby 
excluding those who either do not have access to, or come within 
the parameters of that "truth". Thus, most crits, I think, eschew 
pretensions to truth and make their arguments on significantly more 
modest grounds, they recognize the importance of openness, and 
78 Galloway draws on Brosnan's, "Serious but Not Critical" (1987), 60 So. 
Cal. LR 259, 270. 
79 See for example, A. Hyde, "The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology 
of Law" (1983), Wisconsin LR 379. See also Birmingham Centre for 
Contemporary Cultural Studies, On Ideology (1978); C. Sumner, Reading 
Ideologies ( 1979). 
80 The ideological ramifications of our gendered nature provides a good example 
of what I am trying to get at here. See, for example, M. Belenky et al., 
Women 's Ways of Knowing (1986). 
8 1  Consider, for example, Michael Walzer's defence of American warmongering 
in the Gulf in pursuit of its economic self interest, CBC Radio, "Sunday 
Morning", 10th Feb. 1991. 
82 See for example, R.M. Unger, "The System of Rights", False Necessity ( 1987), 
508; S. Lynd, "Community Rights" ( 1984), 62 Texas LR 1417. 
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they subscribe to the virtues of contingency and self reflexivity. 
This, of course, does not make their political decision-making easy 
or· uncontroversial for contextualism has its price. However, it has 
the virtue of not avoiding responsibility for one's choices based 
upon something called "truth". 
Even more interesting than these misunderstandings of critical 
positions is the nature of the partial defence that Galloway raises 
for liberalism. His basic position is that the critical agenda is 
mistargetted because the problems it highlights exist with the 
political reality of modernity, "the defects in the political order" 
[265) and not with the "ideas promoted by (liberal) legal theorists" 
[264]. These are, indeed, interesting propositions to put forward 
and they echo his earlier claim that liberalism as an academic 
tradition - as perhaps "too rich a tradition" [264] - must be 
distinguished from liberalism as political practice. But there are, 
in my opinion, some real problems here. 
First, Galloway's claim "(t)hat the political world may overlap 
with the theoretical but they do not share an identity" [264] betrays 
a disturbing assumption that theory transcends politics, that theory 
is somehow free floating. This fails to come to terms with the critical 
conception of ideology that sees the production of theory as always 
and already overdetermined by relations of power. Second, yet again, 
Galloway overextends the ambitions of the critical analysis. Crits 
are not such idealists to believe that legal theorists are crucial to 
the legitimation strategies perpetrated by the politically and cul­
turally powerful. The critical position, as I have emphasized before, 
is that perpetuating the ideology of liberalism, even when they 
attempt to reupholster it in the pursuit of what even some crits 
might consider to be progressive ends,83 renders them complicit 
in the continuance of relations of domination and subordination. 
The suggestion of the crits is that if legal theorists want to pursue 
the ideals of substantive equality to facilitate genuine conditions 
for individual fulfilment, then the critical path is the better one 
to take for it is less contaminated by - though certainly not immune 
to - the politics of domination and subordination. 
These concerns are further reinforced when Galloway admits, 
as he must, that liberal theorists fail "often to carry their ideals 
through to consider the implications of their theory for p·articular 
groups within the community" such as "native groups and women" 
[264 ], that is, those who are dispossessed by the past and present 
practices of liberal political practice. But Galloway leaves begging 
the question of why this is the case? Let me make two brief 
conjectures that build on earlier parts of this essay. The first is 
that I think that liberal legal theorists, particularly those within 
the analytical philosophical tradition, begin and end their analyses 
of freedom, liberty, equality and rights at the level of the conceptual, 
never really coming to terms with the existential reality of sub-
83 In Raz's case, I am thinking about his seeming support for Palestinian "self­
determination", Morality, 207. 
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ordination.84 This is not to be taken as an argument against 
conceptualism or theory, but only to re-emphasize that we are the 
products of our circumstances and that what we know, and how 
we even begin to get a grasp of what we know, depends upon 
the specificities of our experiences. My second proposition is more 
programmatic. If modern liberal democratic society is to become 
more responsive to the egalitarian demands of those who have been 
the victims of liberal praxis, then this will require dramatic trans­
formation of our political, legal, social and economic structures; 
it will require full and equal participation in all the decision-making 
spheres of existence; it will require that no aspect of our relations 
be rendered immune to political reconstruction.85 However, to take 
Raz as an example, his perfectionist theory is not only premised 
upon a traditionally narrow conception of "the political"86 but, in 
fact, is deliberately constructed so as to avoid the mobilization that 
would be engendered by "a radical programme of change through 
political action"·. s1 
There is a further point here. Galloway also suggests that even 
though liberal theorists themselves have not addressed the needs 
of, for example, women or native people, liberal theory can be 
extended to incorporate them [264 ]. This, I believe, is a problematic 
position to take. It structurally places those who have been dis­
advantaged by patriarchal and ethnocentric privilege in a position 
of petitioning to be now counted as part of the extended liberal 
family.88 It does not consider that, perhaps, some of the key concepts 
of liberalism (whatever they might be after the Razian renovation) 
may themselves be so contingent upon or loaded with preconceptions 
of privilege that they are fundamentally antithetical to the world 
view of those who would be allegedly advantaged. Consider, for 
example, Mary Ellen Turpel's argument that the very nature of 
the discourse of rights is alien to First Nation's peoples and that 
the Charter - and the monopolization of the modes of discourse 
engendered by it - is another form of cultural imperialism;89 or 
Carol Smart's proposition that modern law is a juridogenic social 
practice.90 Galloway's deeply entrenched assumption is that liber­
alism should be assumed to be at the centre of the jurisprudential 
universe, and that it be given a chance to work for these outsiders. 
84 These suspicions are intensified when we are told that Raz, for example, 
"doesn't do much non-philosophical reading, except for the New York Review 
of Books" . See Levine, supra note 28, 739. 
85 See generally, R.M. Unger, Politics (1987) and I.M. Young, Justice and the 
Politics of Dif erence ( 1990). 
86 Morality, 3. 
s7 id., 427. 
88 For a more extended discussion of this problem see Alexandra Z. Dobro­
wolsky, "Promises Unfulfilled: Women and the Theory and Practice of 
Representative Democracy in Canada" (1990). 
89 M.E. Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter: Interpretive 
Monopolies, Cultural Differences", in Perspectives, supra note 6, 503. 
9° Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989), 161. 
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Surely, the burden should be the other way. Liberal theory because 
of its acknowledged failure to deal with liberal practice should be 
assumed to be unsalvageable. The responsibility would be on 
liberalism to prove itself amenable. A starting point might be for 
revisionists like Raz to recognize class, race and gender as something 
more than non-issues. 
In the end, it all boils down to an exercise in passing the buck, 
for as Galloway claims, the focus of the critical legal enterprise 
should be on "the defects in the political order rather than in our 
philosophical traditions or theoretical ambitions" (265]. The radical 
- and here I am using it in relation to its Greek etymology, that 
is, "going to the root of' - point is that these traditions and ambitions 
cannot escape their cultural - less euphemistically, class, racial 
and sexual - and historical context, they are a constitutive part 
of the political order. Like Galloway's paper, liberalism as a 
philosophical tradition has become part of the problem, not part 
of the solution.91 
CONCLUSION 
As I stated at the beginning of this essay, I think that Galloway's 
intervention is an important contribution to the jurisprudential 
conversation. I certainly welcome it. However, my reasons for 
appreciating it may not be those which he would expect. First, 
assuming that he is correct that crits are guilty of false representation, 
absence of consideration, reductionism, absence of discrimination 
and an instrumental conception of liberal theory (all of which I 
have denied), it should be clear that he too is guilty of some of 
the same sins. Second, and more interestingly, I welcome Galloway's 
essay because its value, from my perspective, lies not so much in 
what it says but in what it implies. Primarily it is driven by a fear 
that the crits are being too successful, that they have destabilized 
the hegemony of the liberal legal academy, that they have decentred 
the liberal discursive agenda. But this, I think, is an overreaction. 
Critical legal studies, in an ironic sort of way, continues to reaffirm 
the centrality of liberalism because so much of liberalism remains 
at the core of the critical agenda. The only difference is that it 
is no longer portrayed in its best light. In short, crits admit that 
it is dominant ideology. Galloway's essay in retrieval, when viewed 
in this light, is intriguing because it provides a classic case study 
of liberal ideological fideism, that in spite of itself acknowledges 
the poverty of liberal legalism, confirming rather than denying the 
accuracy of the critical position. 
91 There are several other sub-allegations that Galloway makes against the 
crits. I have dealt with what I consider to be the more important ones, 
and I do not wish to burden the reader with a reply to every complaint. 
